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Abstract. The rapid progress in genome sequencing technologies leads
to availability of high amounts of genomic data. Accelerating the pace of
biomedical breakthroughs and discoveries necessitates not only collect-
ing millions of genetic samples but also granting open access to genetic
databases. However, one growing concern is the ability to protect the
privacy of sensitive information and its owner. In this work, we survey
a wide spectrum of cross-layer privacy breaching strategies to human
genomic data (using both public genomic databases and other public
non-genomic data). We outline the principles and outcomes of each tech-
nique, and assess its technological complexity and maturation. We then
review potential privacy-preserving countermeasure mechanisms for each
threat.
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1 Introduction
Today, next-generation sequencing technologies (NGS) are capable of generat-
ing a tremendous amount of sequencing data. As a result, the production of
genetic information for research, clinical care, and direct-to-consumer genomics
at a rapid pace is no longer impossible from the technological point of view.
The availability of human genetic biobanks provides an adequate basis for sev-
eral important applications and studies. Genomic research typically includes
collecting samples from thousands of individuals, but a large push is underway
to sequence hundreds of thousands to millions of genomes aiming at discover-
ing the functional impact of de novo (not inherited from either parent) genetic
variations on diseases such as autism and cancer [9]. Accelerating the pace of bio-
medical breakthroughs and discoveries necessitates not only collecting millions
of genetic samples, but also granting open access to the genetic biobanks and
databases. This trend has caused the launch of more than one thousand pub-
licly available online genetic databases, in which individuals publicly share their
genomic data [5]. Several studies [11,16] show that the majority (i.e., 69–92 %)
of the respondents have positive attitudes towards genomics research and donat-
ing their DNA samples. The most common intention behind it is to support the
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personalized medicine studies. Second, to learn about their genetic predisposi-
tions to diseases and even their genetic compatibilities with potential partners.
Last but not least, to identify their distant patrilineal relatives and the potential
surnames of their biological fathers. However, the overwhelming majority of the
respondents rank privacy of sensitive information as one of their top concerns.
Thus, the biggest challenge of widely utilizing the human genomes and pushing
the frontiers of the genetic research is both social and technical. In the literature,
there exist reviews addressing genomic privacy (e.g., [4,12]). This paper focuses
on the cross-layer attacks against genomic privacy of individuals (using both
genomic and non-genomic data) and proposes potential countermeasure mech-
anisms in a systematic way. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sect. 2, we survey a wide spectrum of known privacy threats to human genomic
data. In Sect. 3, we overview the existing works and present our recommenda-
tions and guidelines for potential privacy-preserving countermeasure techniques
for each threat. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sect. 4.
2 Genetic Privacy Breaching Strategies
In this section, we survey a wide spectrum of privacy threats to human genomic
data, as reported by prior research. In general, we assume the existence of a
passive attacker who has bounded computational power. In all below threats,
the attacker only has access to publicly available genetic databases and other
publicly available resources on the Internet.
2.1 Identity Tracing by Meta-Data and Side-Channel Leaks
In such an attack, as illustrated in Fig. 1, the hacker or curious party needs both
human genomic data, which is already available online via a certain privacy-
preserving mechanism (i.e., hiding the identity information of the owner), and
additional metadata. Such an attack, once it succeeds, can cause serious implica-
tions, for instance genetic discrimination, financial loss, and blackmail. A real-life
example of this threat was in 1997 when Sweeney [17] successfully identified the
medical condition of William Weld, former governor of Massachusetts, using only
his demographic data (i.e., date of birth, gender, and 5-digit ZIP code) appearing
in the hospital records and voter registration forms that are available to everyone.
In 2013, Sweeney [18] again showed that it is possible to utilize the demographic
data to discover the real identities of the DNA donors even though their names
are removed from the published genomic database. The approach was very sim-
ilar to her previous attack, besides, in this work, she exploited the side-channel
data in the downloaded genomic data files associated with anonymized PGP pro-
files. Even for some participants, once the downloaded file was uncompressed,
the resulting file had a filename that included the actual name of participant.
2.2 Identity Tracing by Genealogical Triangulation
In most human societies, surnames are paternally inherited, resulting a cor-
relation with specific Y-chromosome haplotypes. Thus, there are several online
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Fig. 1. A possible route for identity tracing using both metadata/side-channel leaks
and phenotypic prediction.
public databases (e.g., Ysearch.org and SMGF.org) that collectively contain hun-
dreds of thousands of surname-haplotype records, aiming at helping the public to
identify their distant patrilineal relatives and the potential surnames of their bio-
logical fathers. However, these services can be exploited by an adversary towards
learning the participant’s identity, as illustrated in Fig. 2. With the help of sur-
name inferences in addition to the birth year and Zip code, the search results
can be narrowed down the identity to few matches that can be investigated
individually [6].
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Fig. 2. A possible route for identity tracing using genealogical triangulation.
2.3 Identity Tracing by Phenotypic Prediction
Visible phenotypes from genetic data could help in identity tracing. Such visible
traits with high heritability that can be inferred from DNA include height, eye
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color, facial morphology, and age [10]. These traits can then be used as quasi-
identifiers for decreasing the degree of uncertainty to infer the identity of an
individual with the help of public records and social networks as explained in
Fig. 1. However, using only these quasi-identifiers for re-identification does not
provide high accuracy; as the population-wide registries of these visible traits
are not publicly accessible and searchable.
2.4 Attribute Disclosure Attacks via DNA (ADAD)
The main concept of ADAD is when the adversary gains access to the DNA
sample of the target. Using the identified DNA, the adversary can search genetic
databases with sensitive attributes (e.g., drug abuse) as shown in Fig. 3. Finding
the identified DNA in the database reveals the link between the person and the
sensitive attribute. Based on [4], three scenarios are identified to illustrate the
attribute disclosure attacks: the n=1 scenario, the summary statistic scenario,
and the gene expression scenario. The n=1 scenario is the simplest scenario
of ADAD. By acquiring a chosen set of 45 autosomal single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNPs)1, the adversary can simply match the genotype data that is
associated with the identity of the individual with the genotype data that is asso-
ciated with the attribute [14]. Thus, Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS)
stores individual genotypes and phenotypes in restricted access area, while the
statistics of allele frequencies2 are stored in the public access area. In spite of
the separation, GWAS datasets with allele frequencies of the participants have
been exploited by the ADAD’s summary statistic scenario [7] as follows: The
allele frequencies are positively biased towards the target genotypes in the case
group compared to the allele frequencies of the general population. Moreover,
the analyzed common variations can be exploited to conduct ADAD by integrat-
ing the biases in the allele frequencies over a large number of SNPs in GWAS.
Therefore, the performance of ADAD is a function of the size of the study and
the adversary’s prior knowledge. Apart from GWAS, the NIH’s Gene Expression
Omnibus (GEO) databases are also vulnerable to the ADAD’s gene expression
scenario [15]. The GEO database holds hundreds of thousands of human gene
expression profiles and their linked medical attributes. However, the NIH did not
change their policies regarding sharing the gene expression data due to several
complications of this threat.
2.5 Completion Attacks
In genomics, genotype imputation is a well-studied task in which genetic informa-
tion can be reconstructed from partial data by completing the missing genotype
values. A well-known example of a completion attack is the inference of Jim Wat-
son’s predisposition for Alzheimer’s disease from his published genome, despite
1 SNPs are the main cause for variations in the human genome. They are also respon-
sible for the differences in our phenotypes/traits and genotypes.
2 The allele frequency represents the incidence of a gene variant at a given gene location
in a population gene pool.
Can you Really Anonymize the Donors of Genomic Data 241
 Victim with more 





from studies and 
statistics about the 
distribution of certain 
diseases or genotype 
in specific population
1
Calculating the probabilities of 
each individual who were 
involved in the published 
studies or statistics to hold 















Fig. 3. Attribute disclosure attacks via DNA.
removing the ApoE locus gene (which is the indicator for Alzheimer’s predis-
position) from the published data [13]. Completion techniques can be used to
predict the genomic information when there is no access to the DNA of a known
individual, as shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4. A possible route for identity de-anonymization using a completion attack.
3 Mitigation Techniques
In this section, we survey a wide spectrum of known privacy-preserving tech-
niques against each aforementioned threat and make suggestions to prevent
such threats. Here, we focus on the scenario, in which genomic data or the
results of GWAS are made publicly available. There are also crypto-based mit-
igation techniques in which genomic data of individuals is stored in a database
in encrypted form, and hence it is not publicly available on the Internet. Once
other parties (e.g., medical centers) want to do operations on the data, they
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apply privacy-preserving techniques and they only obtain the result of the oper-
ation without having access to whole data. In this line of research, Ayday et
al. proposed privacy-preserving techniques for medical tests and personalized
medicine methods [2]. Baldi et al. make use of both medical and cryptographic
tools for privacy-preserving paternity tests, personalized medicine, and genetic
compatibility tests [3]. Also Ayday et. al developed a technique for privacy-
compliant processing of raw genomic data [1]. We note that such scenarios, in
which genomic data is not publicly shared, are out-of-the-scope of this paper.
3.1 Identity Tracing by Meta-Data and Side-Channel Leaks
As discussed in this threat model, metadata can be used for inferring the identi-
ties of involved individuals. Hence, any metadata that may decrease the level of
privacy, should either be removed from datasets or strictly follow the 2002 Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. Data cov-
ered under HIPAA should follow certain strict formats; dates (e.g. birth, admit-
tance, and discharge dates) would only contain the year, the ZIP code would only
have the first 2 digits if the population in the ZIP code is less than 20,000 people,
and no explicit identifiers (e.g. Social Security numbers) would be present.
3.2 Identity Tracing by Genealogical Triangulation
The first step towards protecting against this attack depends on the purpose of
the genetic database. If the database provides services for descendants of anony-
mous sperm donors to identify the surnames of their potential biological father
and distant patrilineal relatives, then it should be an access-controlled database.
Otherwise, the surname should be removed or replaced with the given name
in haplotype records in order to decrease the ability of connecting surname to
unknown’s genome [6]. Reconstruction attacks based on available online datasets
should be performed to measure the connection of surname or other unique iden-
tifier with genomic data.
3.3 Identity Tracing by Phenotypic Prediction
To prevent this threat, data about visible traits of individuals in public genomic
databases as well as other public sources should be restricted (only to qualified
researchers or close connections) or removed whenever applicable in order to
preserve privacy. Nonetheless, predicting a victim’s phenotypes is not only based
on the revealed information through genetic databases; online social networks
can also be a rich source of public sensitive data, and hence privacy risk will be
amplified.
3.4 Attribute Disclosure Attacks via DNA (ADAD)
To address this threat, data perturbation techniques (e.g., differential privacy)
can be used for adding noise to the result of a query (on a genomic database)
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before releasing it publicly. In this way, the reported result will not be much
different than original result, but an adversary will not understand if a given
individual is in the database or not. Assuming the genomic database includes
individuals with a given sensitive attribute, an adversary with prior knowledge
can never be sure if that sensitive attribute belongs to a specific individual, as
similar results will be given when the individual is included in the database or
not. However, the added noise should be carefully considered as it will affect the
accuracy and the utility of the data at the expense of privacy.
3.5 Completion Attacks
For this attack that relies on reconstructing genetic information based on partial
data, one must consider all available data of each individual that is publicly
shared (either by himself, his family members, or genomic researchers). If with
existing completion techniques, one can predict the missing genomic information
then specific parts of genomic data should be removed from datasets. Another
solution is using dedicated cryptographic techniques, which enable researchers
to access only some parts of the genome by requesting the decryption key from
the owner. Such solutions can be merged with the reconstruction attack model
from [8] to infer the amount of risk that occurs with releasing new portions of
data.
4 Conclusion
The main concern when publishing anonymized genomic information is usually
the privacy of its owner. As it is not trivial to predict the amount of information
that will be available to the attacker in today’s digital World, existing technical
solutions alone are not sufficient to ensure long-term privacy for genomic data
donors, and hence their family members. Therefore, there should be a collabora-
tive effort between technical solutions, policies, and legislation (e.g. HIPAA, EU
data protection law) to maintain privacy-compliant public genetic databases. As
discussed, cryptographic solutions can be an option, but such solutions prevent
public availability of genomic data, somehow decreasing the pace of genomic
research. This trade-off should also be further investigated.
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